Essential bundle theory and modality by Jago, Mark
Synthese
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1819-3
S.I . : GROUND, ESSENCE, MODALITY
Essential bundle theory and modality
Mark Jago1
Received: 1 June 2017 / Accepted: 19 May 2018
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties. On
the traditional approach, these are the properties possessed by that material object.
That view faces a deep problem: it seems to say that all of an object’s properties are
essential to it. Essential bundle theory attempts to overcome this objection, by taking
the bundle as a specification of the object’s essential properties only. In this paper, I
show that essential bundle theory faces a variant of the objection. To avoid the problem,
the theory must accept the contingency of identity. I show how this can be achieved
in a coherent and well-motivated way, a way that isn’t available to traditional bundle
theories.
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1 Introduction
What are material objects, metaphysically speaking? We might try to reduce them
to some other metaphysical category of being. We might tell a story on which (non-
fundamental) material objects are built out of basic bits of matter. We might identify
material objects with the area of spacetime they inhabit. Or we might treat them as
primitive, so that there is no informative understanding of what they are in general.
Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties and, in so doing,
reduce the category material object to the category property.
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Reductive approaches are attractive if the base category is better understood than the
reduced category. Or it might be that the base category is better supported by scientific
theorising than the reduced category. Or it might just be attractive to have one less
fundamental category in our ontology. In the case of bundle theory, it’s plausible that
the second and third reasons apply. Fundamental science has predicates for mass,
charge, and spin, and this speaks in favour of the ontological category property. It’s
far less clear that fundamental science has material objects as part of its ontology.
Bundle theories face a range of powerful objections. I’m going to focus on one here:
that bundle theories seem to imply that material objects have no contingent properties.
I’ll call this the modal problem. The problem motivates a revision to bundle theory.
Essential bundle theory (Barker and Jago 2017; Jago 2016) reduces material objects
to bundles of properties, as any bundle theory does. But according to essential bundle
theory, that bundle specifies the essence of the material object. The properties in
the bundle are all essential to the object. (Throughout, I’ll understand the concept of
essence in a broadly Aristotelian sense, along the lines discussed by Fine (1994, 1995)
and Lowe (2008, 2012), and not as an equivalent expression of being necessarily such
that.)
My aim in this paper is to evaluate whether essential bundle theory genuinely
escapes the problem. I won’t consider arguments in favour of bundle theory in general
or essential bundle theory in particular. I’ll begin by setting up a version of the modal
problem, as it affects traditional bundle theory (Sect. 2). I’ll then show how a variant of
the problem hits essential bundle theory (Sect. 3). A key premise in the argument is the
necessity of identity (Sect. 4). We might reject this principle by accepting counterpart
semantics (Sect. 5). But I do not think we should accept Lewis’s (1968, 1971, 1986)
own interpretation of counterpart semantics, in terms of similarity relations (Sect.
7). Instead, counterpart semantics has a very natural interpretation in terms of essen-
tial bundle theory (Sect. 7). I’ll argue that this approach avoids the modal problem.
Finally, I’ll briefly indicate how far this approach takes us towards a general analysis
of modality within essential bundle theory (Sect. 8).
2 The modal problem for bundle theories
Bundle theories of material objects are attempts at an ontological explanation of what
material objects are. They reduce the category material object to the category property,
with the aid of some bundling operation. Schematically, using ‘B(F1, F2, . . .)’ to
represent a bundle formed of properties F1, F2, . . . : bundle theory identifies each
material object with some B(F1, F2, . . .), for some choice of properties F1, F2, . . . .
Traditionally, bundles play two roles at once. They provide the identity of a material
object x , via an explicit identification of x with some bundle B(F1, F2, . . .). They also
provide an analysis of property possession, which is understood in terms of bundle
membership. So traditional bundle theories accept the following theses:
(Constitution role) Material objects are identified with bundles of proper-
ties, so that bundled properties constitute material objects.
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(Property possession role) An object x possesses property F if and only
if F is a member of the x-bundle.
Just how the bundling operation should be understood is highly controversial.
(Hawthorne and Sider (2002) discuss the issue in detail.) If we are to identify mate-
rial objects with bundles, then the B operation must be something which produces
unity from plurality. Saying ‘B(F1, F2, . . .)’ cannot merely mean that the properties
F1, F2, . . . are B-related together, for then, it would make no sense for us to identify
a material object x with B(F1, F2, . . .). Rather, ‘B(F1, F2, . . .)’ is a term denoting an
entity, one which is somehow built from F1, F2, . . . . (Lewis (1991) allows a many-one
notion of identity. But he also holds that any plurality forms a whole, so it remains the
case that there is a single entity comprising F1, F2, . . . .)
Both set-formation and mereological summation fit the bill: both deliver a unified
entity from plurality. The set-term ‘{F1, F2, . . .}’ denotes an entity and so it makes
sense to write ‘x = {F1, F2, . . .}’. But it is hard to argue that material objects are sets
of entities. Mereological summation (composition) also delivers a unified entity from
plurality. The mereological sum F1 unionsq F2 unionsq· · · is the whole whose parts are F1, F2, . . . .
Taking bundles to be mereological sums of properties gives us mereological bundle
theory (McDaniel 2001; Paul 2002, 2006).
Many aspects of this approach are unclear. Even so, we can run a problem for the
approach. Each material object is identical to a bundle of properties. But a property
bundle is the bundle it is because of the properties thereby bundled. The properties
constituting the bundle provide its identity. Remove one property instance and you
have a different bundle. Not so for material objects, which typically could have been
many different ways. So it is hard to claim that material objects are bundles.
A key principle in this argument is that the properties found in a bundle are necessary
to it: that, if property F is a constituent of bundle B, then it’s necessary that F is a
constituent of B. That’s clearly justified if bundles are sets, since sets have their
members of necessity. Is it true of mereological sums also? Is it in general true that, if
x is a mereological part of y, then it is necessarily so? Many philosophers think that
this principle of mereological necessitarianism is true. (The principle is usually called
‘mereological essentialism’, using the modal sense of ‘essence’.)
Armstrong (1978, pp. 37–38) and Baxter (1988) argue that objects sharing a part
are thereby partly identical and that identity (whether full or partial) is necessary
wherever it holds. Or relatedly, one might hold that ‘composition is identity’ (Lewis
1991), allowing for a many-one notion of identity holding between parts and whole.
Then parthood will hold of necessity just in case identity does. A more moderate view
is that parthood is, in important ways, akin to identity (Sider 2007), such that we should
not take one but not the other to hold of necessity.
A different source of justification can be found in the analogue between formal
extensional mereology and set theory. Both rely on a principle of extensionality, which
seems to say that sets/wholes are defined in terms of their members/parts. If it is
because of this principle (and what else could it be?) that we take a set’s members
to be necessary to it, then we should say the same about wholes and their parts. And
indeed, if one attempts a reduction of set theory to mereology, as Lewis (1991) does,
then one is committed to mereological necessitarianism.
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It is instructive to ask what we would need to add to classical mereology in order to
derive mereological necessitarianism. To formulate mereological necessitarianism, we
need a quantified modal logic. Suppose we choose the combination of propositional
modal logic (KT) and classical quantification theory. Then, to derive mereological
necessitarianism, we need add only the principle that terms ‘x unionsq y’ (‘the sum of x and
y’) are rigid designators whenever ‘x’ and ‘y’ are. This principle is very plausible.
To deny this is to allow that we could have put x and y together and thereby obtained
something other than the sum we in fact get. This is hard to accept, given that we want
to say that the sum of x and y is determined by (and has its identity fixed by) x and y
only. We can code the rigidity of sum-terms by adding ∃z(z = x unionsq y) as an axiom.
Then, as Uzquiano (2014) shows, mereological necessitarianism is a theorem. The
argument above will then go through and traditional bundle theory will be committed
to saying, absurdly, that material objects have all of their properties necessarily.
One response is that this formal system (through its combination of classical quan-
tification and KT) also proves the converse Barcan formula and, as a consequence,
the necessity of existence (∀x∃y x = y). These are contentious principles and the
bundle theorist may argue that we should reject them, in favour of a free quantified
modal logic (plus classical mereology). Nevertheless, such systems still prove:
(rmn) If x  y (‘x is a part of y’) then necessarily, x  y if both x and y exist.
This principle is bad news for bundle theorists. They hold that properties (whether
universals or tropes) are not dependent on their bearers for their identities or their
existence. Properties are ontologically prior to the particulars that possess them. On
this picture, a qualitative property like being wholly red or being wholly blue may have
been possessed by (i.e., been a part of) some particular other than the one which in
fact possesses it, as in this model:
w1 : blue  ared  b w2 :
red  a
blue  b
But since red  a in w2 and red exists in w1, (rmn) entails that red  a in w1 too.
So a is both wholly red and wholly blue in w1, which is impossible. (The argument
can be run with any pair of incompatible properties, so nothing turns on the choice of
colour properties.)
In short, we have good reason to think that traditional bundle theory is deeply
problematic.
3 Essential bundle theory
Essential bundle theory is an attempt to overcome the modal problem, without aban-
doning a bundle theory entirely. It rejects property possession role and, in its
place, accepts:
(Nature thesis) Property bundles specify the nature or essence of the material
object in question. Material object x is essentially F if and only if (an instance
of) F is a part of x’s bundle.
123
Synthese
The guiding idea is that, if identification with a bundle gives us the identity of a
material object, then the properties in that bundle are what fixes that object’s nature.
They determine what the object is. Change the properties involved and we would have
some other material object. So those properties are not accidental to the object in
question. They are essential to it and not merely in the sense that they are necessary
to the object. They are essential in the Aristotelian sense that they are a part of the
object’s being what it is. The bundle gives the object’s essence (in roughly the sense
of essence discussed by Fine (1994, 1995) and Lowe (2008, 2012)). The object’s
accidental properties are accounted for in some other way. This is a picture, not an
argument. But it is persuasive, on the assumption that we are to identify material
objects with bundles of properties.
This move, motivated by this simple thought, reaps a number of benefits. One
is a solution to the grounding problem. The problem is to account for the different
properties of distinct but coincident objects, such as a person and their material body.
I discuss the solution offered by essential bundle theory elsewhere (Jago 2016). The
advantage that’s relevant here concerns the modal problem, which essential bundle
theory seems to resolve easily. It accepts that, if a material object a is identified with a
bundle B(. . . , F, . . .), then it is necessary that a is F . But this is no longer problematic,
for in identifying a with B(F1, F2, . . .), we treat a as being essentially F1, essentially
F2 (and so on) and hence necessarily all those ways. The argument from Sect. 2 is
blocked at the start, for we can’t infer from a’s being F to a’s being identified with
some bundle B(. . . , F, . . .). For that, we would need to assume that a is essentially
F ; and then the conclusion, that it is necessary that a is F , is unproblematic.
To see whether essential bundle theory really does escape the objection, we need
the full details of the theory. I’ll argue below that (a variant of) the objection still bites.
Essential bundle theory has two building blocks: properties, which we can think of
as universals, and spacetime regions. The spacetime regions (or the points of which
they are composed) are primitive and not reducible to the category of properties. So
this is not a pure bundle theory: some things in the ontology are not reducible to
bundles of properties. Material objects are then built from property instances, such as
this bit of charge over here, or that bit of redness over there. A key theoretical notion
of essential bundle theory is instantiation, which takes a property-type (universal) F
and a spatiotemporal region r and delivers the property instance Fr , F-in-region-r ,
which is an entity in its own right. This is not a state of affairs, that r possesses F .
Instantiation is a theoretical notion, capturing the idea that we find the same property-
type in different locations. Having or possessing a property, as in a predication ‘a
is F’, is a different notion. At this stage in the metaphysical construction, there are
universals, spacetime regions, and property-instances, but no material objects to bear
those properties.
(One could instead treat property-instances as primitives of the theory. One then
needs an account of when two instances x and y are instances of property-type F
and when they are instances in the same region r . So long as we can associate each
property-instance with both a unique property-type F and a unique region r , we can
express the theory.)
Essential bundle theory then takes a material object to be mereological sum of non-
modal, non-sortal property instances, satisfying certain conditions. The sums must
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be consistent; all the instances must share the same spatiotemporal region; and the
bundle must be suitably closed (Barker and Jago 2017). Very roughly, the idea is that
bundles containing an instance of is red also contain an instance of is coloured, but may
contain an instance of is coloured without containing any of its determinates. Modal
and sortal properties are excluded from bundles, as these properties are analysed in
terms of bundle-membership.
This is a very brief sketch of the theory. My aim here isn’t to evaluate the arguments
in its favour. (For full details of the theory and the arguments in its favour, see Barker
and Jago 2017 and Jago 2016.) Rather, I want to investigate whether the theory is
successful in overcoming the modal problem from Sect. 2. If it is, then there is a
strong case that bundle theorists should adopt essential bundle theory. Arguments
for bundle theory in general can then be turned into arguments for essential bundle
theory in particular, simply by noting the severity of the modal problem for other
bundle theories. But if essential bundle theory is not successful in overcoming the
modal problem, then it is hard to see how it makes any progress on traditional bundle
theories.
We’ve got enough of the details of the theory to see how a variant of the modal
problem emerges. According to essential bundle theory, a material object a is identified
with a bundle B (a mereological sum) of property instances, Fr1 , . . . , Frn , all associated
with the same region r . According to the theory, a property instance Fr is, by definition,
located in region r . That is of the essence of the instance and so it is necessary that Br
is located in region r . The problem then goes as follows.
Suppose a is, as a matter of fact, located in region r . Then, for some Fr1 , Fr2 , . . . , we
have a = Fr1 unionsq Fr2 unionsq· · · . That is, each Fri is a part of a and they (and their proper parts,
if they have any) are all of a’s parts. But given that we should accept mereological
necessitarianism (Sect. 2), each such Fri is necessarily a part of a (and nothing that
isn’t in fact a part of a could have been). So, necessarily, a = Fr1 unionsq Fr2 unionsq · · · . But it
is also necessary that each such Fri is located in region r . So it is necessary that a is
located in region r . Each material object is ‘modally stuck’: wherever it is in time and
space, it is necessarily there. We cannot accept that.
The objection isn’t the familiar objection against four-dimensional theories that,
according to the theory, objects do not move. (Sider (2003) discusses the issue in
general.) Rather, the objection is that the path through time and space a material
object takes is deemed a necessary feature of that object. It could not have taken
another path: it could not have started its life a little earlier, nor ended its life a little
later, nor been anywhere else at a given moment of its existence, according to the
theory. I could not have been in Utrecht, rather than Amsterdam, right now. That is an
unacceptable consequence. If the theory cannot avoid it, we must reject the theory.
4 The necessity of identity
A key premise in this argument, as in the original modal argument from Sect. 2, is the
necessity of identity. I argued in Sect. 2 that, given the necessity of identity, it is hard
to avoid mereological necessitarianism. But if we allowed cases of contingent identity,
the argument would not go through. For if either a or b could have been something
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else, then it is easy to see how the sum of a and b could have been something else.
That is, if a = c but it’s possible that a = c, then it’s possible that a unionsq b = c unionsq b, even
though, in fact, a unionsq b = c unionsq b.
Essential bundle theory requires us to reject mereological necessitarianism, which
in turn requires us to reject the necessity of identity. Essential bundle theory requires
identity to be contingent (in at least some cases). Some true identity statements involv-
ing two singular terms, of the form ‘a = b’, must be possibly false. But can we make
sense of contingent identity at all? Doesn’t logic alone require such identities to be
necessarily true, if true at all? Let’s see.
Here’s an argument for the necessity of identity. Suppose a = b, but contingently
so. Then b has the property of being contingently identical to a. Since a = b, a also
has that property. It follows that a is contingently identical to a and so ♦a = a. But
a = a is a logical truth, hence necessarily true, and so ¬♦a = a: contradiction. By
reductio and propositional logic, if a = b, then necessarily, a = b.
Since arguments like this can often take the appearance of a cheap trick, let’s set it
out carefully. Suppose we have a true contingent identity:
(1) a = b ∧ ♦a = b
From the second conjunct, we can abstract the complex predicate λx♦a = x and infer
that it holds of b:
(2) (λx♦a = x)b
Given a = b and Leibniz’s Law, we infer that a satisfies the same logically complex
predicate as b:
(3) (λx♦a = x)a
from which we infer
(4) ♦a = a
which is equivalent to ¬a = a. But we can infer a = a from the necessitation rule
(from  A to  A), given that a = a is a logical axiom. So, by reductio on (1), we
infer
(5) ¬(a = b ∧ ♦a = b)
which is equivalent to
(6) a = b → a = b.
The argument makes essential use of Leibniz’s Law, which is suspect in modal
contexts. We cannot infer from ‘it’s not necessary that I am the lecturer’ and ‘it is
necessary that the lecturer is the lecturer’ to ‘I am not the lecturer’. But the inference
above used Leibniz’s Law outside the scope of any modal operator. It had the form:
Fb, a = b, therefore, Fb.
The argument seems convincing. Any attempt to make sense of contingent identity
will, at the very least, have to diagnose where the argument breaks down.
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5 A model of contingent identity
Counterpart theory (Lewis 1968) offers a great deal of flexibility in interpreting modal
talk. The basic idea is that we analyse how a might have been by looking at how
counterparts of a are at other possible worlds. The semantics adds a counterpart
relation between elements of the domain at worlds, taking the form: individual x2 at
world w2 is a counterpart of x1 at world w1. If the domains of distinct worlds never
overlap (as Lewis requires), then we can simplify and say that x2 is a counterpart of
x1.
Possibility is then given its semantic analysis via existential quantification over
worlds and counterparts therein; necessity via universal quantification over worlds
and counterparts therein. More precisely, where each ‘ci ’ is a constant or unbound
variable:
(S♦) ‘♦A(c1, . . . , cn)’ is analysed as: for some accessible world w and w-counter-
parts c′1, . . . , c′n of c1, . . . , cn (respectively), A(c′1, . . . , c′n).
(S) ‘A(c1, . . . , cn)’ is analysed as: for all accessible worlds w and all w-
counterparts c′1, . . . , c′n of c1, . . . , cn (respectively), A(c′1, . . . , c′n).
(For Lewis (1968), these analyses take the form of a translation scheme, from QML
to the language of counterpart theory.)
For Lewis, counterpart relations are based on similarity. There could have been two
people, each exactly as similar to me as the other. Then, according to Lewis, both are
my counterparts. So an entity can have more than one counterpart in a given world.
This feature generates contingent identity statements:
(7) a = b ∧ ♦a = b
is analysed (translated) as
(8) a = b ∧ (∃w∃x ∈ faw∃y ∈ fbw(x = y))
where fa is the function from worlds w to the set of a’s counterparts at w. This sentence
is satisfiable: just suppose a = b in w, c = d in u, and fau = {c, d}. Nevertheless,
a = a remains valid. Its translation is
(9) ∀w∀x ∈ faw(x = x)
which is first-order valid.
In some sense, this is a possibility in which a is not a. For if b has the property of
being possibly not identical to a and a = b, then a must have that property too. This
seems problematic, for (by logic alone) a is necessary self-identical and so it seems
we cannot allow that a has the property of being possibly not identical to a. This is
the argument we met in Sect. 4. Assuming that a has the property of being necessarily
identical to a and that a = b, we can substitute ‘b’ for ‘a’, inferring that b has the
property of being necessarily identical to a and hence that, necessarily, b = a. (I’ll
come back to whether we should accept this in Sect. 7.)
There are several ways we can modify counterpart theory to avoid the worry. One
is to insist that each entity has at most one counterpart in each world. But this is
unmotivated and, if counterpart relations are similarity relations, then we cannot avoid
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an entity having multiple counterparts in the same world (Lewis 1968). Hazen (1979)
sketches a more sophisticated alternative. Lewis’s own (1971) revision of counterpart
theory makes use of multiple counterpart relations, arising from the different aspects
in which things may be similar or dissimilar. If I am both a person and a body (as
Lewis thinks), then I have both personhood-counterparts and bodyhood-counterparts.
It is then consistent to hold (i) I am my body; (ii) I (qua person) could not have been a
non-person; and (iii) my body (qua body) could have been. These are consistent, since
different counterpart relations are operative in (ii) and (iii): ‘could’ is not constant in
its semantic role. The argument for the necessity of identity from Sect. 4, once phrased
in terms of counterparts, will involve equivocation on ‘counterpart’ and so isn’t valid.
6 Modality as similarity?
Lewis’s counterpart theory thus gives us a model of contingent identity. It would be
straightforward to apply Lewis’s approach wholesale to the traditional bundle theory.
(Paul (2006) presents a bundle theory which uses counterpart theory to account for
modal properties.) A bundle theory could identify a material object a with a bundle B,
but deny that a is necessarily identical to b. The bundle theorist may claim that there
is one measure of similarity which compares entities bundle-wise. Since bundles are
identified by the properties thereby bundled, she might take this bundle-counterpart
relation to be the identity relation, so that each bundle of F1, . . . , Fn is necessarily the
bundle of F1, . . . , Fn . But even if she does this, she may still invoke other counterpart
relations broader than identity and associate these with uses of ‘a’. If she does this,
‘a = B’ will come out contingent.
Essential bundle theory could take a similar approach, with aspects of similarity
restricted by the bundled properties. That is, a measure of F-wise similarity is appro-
priate for material object a only if a includes property F in its bundle. (This is to
guarantee that essences constrain de re modality.) However, if the general approach
is viable, then essential bundle loses much of its advantage over traditional bundle
theory.
Does Lewis’s explanation give us a plausible understanding of modality and hence
a genuine understanding of contingent identity? I don’t think it does. Suppose we
take the analysis of counterpart relations in terms of similarity to be a fully general
principle, so that modality reduces, ultimately, to facts about similarity. This will give
clearly incorrect results. In many contexts, the numbers 3 and 5 count as similar.
Suppose Anna and Bec are bemoaning their bank balances: Anna has just £3 until
she’s paid and Bec has £5. Cath, a high earner and prolific saver, has £10,000. Anna’s
and Bec’s balances are comparatively similar, when set against Cath’s, and so (in that
context) 3 and 5 themselves count as similar numbers. So, in that context, 3 and 5 will
be counterparts of one another.
This gives the disastrous result that, in that context, 3 could have been 5. So (in
that context) 3 + 3 could have been 10. (More carefully: in that context, ‘it is possible
that 3 + 3 = 10’ is true.) For, in that context, 3 has some counterpart which, when
added to itself, results in some counterpart of 10 (which 10 is, since it always exists
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and always resembles itself.) But there is no context at all in which it’s possible that
3 added to itself is 10. In all contexts, that result is impossible.
Note that this argument did not turn on some bizarre, carefully constructed context.
Anna and Bec’s shared context is commonplace and mundane. The argument cannot be
rejected by focusing on the details of the case. Rather, a Lewis-style counterpart theorist
must restrict the similarity principle. It should certainly exclude numbers. Should the
general principle say that necessary existents are excluded? That seems circular, since
the project of counterpart theory is in part to say what is necessary. Should it say that
non-spatiotemporal existents are excluded? That fits well with Lewis’s metaphysics.
But this principle too is troublesome. It applied to sets, of which we’d like to say
that they have their members of necessity. But assume that we’re in a context in which
Anna and Bec (who need not be worldmates) are relevantly similar, so as to count as
counterparts of one another. In that context, it will be true that Anna could have been
the sole member of {Bec}. In that sense, sets will not have their members of necessity.
Worse still, consider the proposition p that Anna is F . Necessarily, p is true iff
Anna is F . Given counterpart theory, this implies that, for any possible world w and
counterpart x of Anna’s at w, p is true at w iff x is F . Now suppose w is a world
at which Anna has two counterparts, Bec and Cath. It follows that Bec is F iff Cath
is. Generalising, any entity may have multiple counterparts at a world only if those
counterparts are indistinguishable (Dorr 2005). But this cannot be right, since Lewis
explicitly allows that entities may have qualitatively distinguishable counterparts at
some world. (And he must say that, if the counterpart relation is to be understood in
terms of similarity.) Worse, if we substitute λx Bec = x for F , we get: (λx Bec =
x)Bec iff (λx Bec = x)Cath at w and hence that Bec = Cath, contradicting our
assumption that Bec and Cath are distinct.
The restriction of the counterparts-via-similarity principle to concrete entities pro-
duces unacceptable results. But, as we saw, the approach is indefensible without some
such restriction. It is thus very difficult to maintain that modality boils down to simi-
larity.
7 Justifying contingent identity
My suggestion is that Lewis’s presentation of counterpart theory involves elements
which can and should be separated. First, there’s the semantic machinery: counterpart
relations and the analysis of ‘’ and ‘♦’ in terms of them. Then there’s all the rest:
a plurality of concrete possible worlds, world-bound individuals, the Humean denial
of necessary connections, and the understanding of counterpart relations in terms of
similarity (Lewis 1971, 1986). I suggest we can make sense of counterpart theory
without any of that. Kripke semantics makes no such philosophical demands; neither
should counterpart semantics.
Here’s the counterpart semantics I prefer. There’s a single counterpart relation,
which relates entities-in-worlds. The relation is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive:
it’s an equivalence relation. Modal operators are analysed as in (S♦) and (S) in Sect.
5, just as Lewis says they are. This generates an S5 logic of de re modality. In particular,
what’s true of x is necessarily possible for x ; what’s necessary for x is necessarily
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necessary for x ; and what’s possibly necessary for x is necessary for x . (This is in
contrast to the Lewisian theory, on which none of these principles hold: see Lewis
1968, pp. 123–124.)
Here’s the philosophical interpretation of counterpart semantics I prefer. A thing’s
counterparts are all those things which share its essence. This ‘same essence’ criterion
underpins the counterpart relation’s being an equivalence. If everything has an indi-
vidual essence, a haecceitistic property of being that very thing, then nothing shares
anything else’s essence. In that case, the counterpart relation is identity, the semantics
reduces to Kripke semantics, and there are no contingent identities.
Individual essences (of material objects, at least) are not compatible with essential
bundle theory. It is an attempt to construct material objects from more metaphysically
basic ingredients: property instances. Those property instances must ultimately be
constructed purely from fundamental properties. But all such properties are qualita-
tive. Or rather, if any are non-qualitative, they are properties of being such-and-such
spacetime point, or being such-and-such abstract entity. That is a commitment of
essential bundle theory (Barker and Jago 2017). Such properties cannot be combined
to give non-qualitative identity properties of non-fundamental material objects. So,
for at least the non-fundamental material objects, essences are purely qualitative.
One might seek, somehow, to modify essential bundle theory on this point. But I
don’t see how this plausibly could be achieved. One impediment is Sider’s notion of
the purity of fundamental reality, that
the fundamental truths involve only fundamental notions. When God was creat-
ing the world, she was not required to think in terms of nonfundamental notions
like city, smile, or candy. (Sider 2011, p. 120)
That principle seems eminently reasonable. But fundamental non-qualitative prop-
erties specifying (say) my identity violate the principle. For if there is a specific
fundamental property of being x , for any non-fundamental x , then there is a funda-
mental truth about x’s identity, which involves the non-fundamental notion of x . Quite
generally, fundamental reality is the stuff of the fundamental laws. There should be
no mention of you, or me, in amongst the story of mass, charge, spin, and so on.
If everything has an essence, but not an individual essence, then the counterpart
relation is an equivalence but not identity. There’s no reason to think each essence has
just one instance in each world. It seems plausible to me that there is something it is
to be a reproduction of a Wassily chair and that all reproductions (or perhaps all those
made by the same manufacturer) have exactly the same essence. It may be objected that
the material origin of an artefact is essential to it, so that two reproduction chairs made
from numerically distinct parts cannot have the same essence. But this strict principle is
hard to maintain. I’ve recently had my reproduction Wassily reupholstered. It’s still the
chair it was. At some point, I’ll have parts of the chrome tubing replaced and it’ll still
be the same chair. Eventually, there’ll be more replaced parts than original ones, but my
chair will remain. Any principle of essentiality of material origins for artefacts needs
to allow for this flexibility. (See Roca-Royes 2016 for discussion.) Once the principle
is suitably flexible, there is nothing to rule out a world with multiple counterparts of
my chair, each having the same essence.
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I don’t want to take a stand on which principle (if any) one should accept on the
essentiality of material origins. There are other delicate issues surrounding the essences
of artefacts and of non-fundamental material objects in general. Again, I don’t want
to take a firm stand. Essential bundle theory is intended as a general framework for
understanding non-fundamental material objects and their essences. It sets out, quite
generally, how those essences are constructed. But it leaves open which properties are
to be found in a given entity’s essence and is thus compatible with a wide range of
views on how a given thing essentially is. It allows (but does not entail) that each chair
has a highly specific (although qualitative) essence. On that view, one chair could have
been another only if both (possible) entities are alike in that highly specific way.
Essential bundle theory also allows (but does not entail) the far more relaxed view
that each chair is essentially a material artefact with the general purpose of supporting
human-sized beings in sitting upright (and that’s it). On that relaxed view, each chair
has the same (very general) essence. If that’s so, then any chair could have been any
other. Probably, the truth lies somewhere between these extremes. I don’t wish to take
a stance here, except to say that a chair is essentially a chair. Each chair has only other
chairs as counterparts and so no chair could have been a penguin, or a natural number.
Similarly, I don’t want to take a stance on what your essence, or mine, is. One picture
is that there’s some complex property of personhood, or perhaps humanity, which we
all share and which exhausts our essence. If that’s so, then I could have been you and
you me. But neither of us could have been a poached egg.
As I’m accepting single-counterpart-relation counterpart semantics, I accept that a
true identity a = b is contingent, whereas a = a is necessary. So I face the objection
from Sect. 4, that a and b have different properties and so cannot be identical after
all. Since it’s possible that a = b, b has the property λx a = x . Since a = b, a must
have that property too. (This was the argument that, in Sect. 5, prompted us to look at
revisions to Lewis’s 1968 theory.)
I accept this argument. What I deny is that, as a consequence, the logical truth a = a
fails to be necessary. It’s true that a has the property of being possibly other than a.
That’s true of a however we denote it. But it doesn’t follow that a is possibly non-
self-identical, or that it lacks the property of being necessarily self-identical. Being
possibly non-self-identical is the property λx♦x = x . Nothing has that property. Being
necessarily self-identical is the property λxx = x . Everything has that. We must
be careful to distinguish λxλy♦x = y’s holding of the pair aa (which it may) from
λx♦x = x’s holding of a (which is impossible).
Lewis (1971, p. 206) agrees with this point, noting that
(10) My body and my body are such that they might not have been identical today,
when rendered as (λxλy♦x = y)bb, comes out true on counterpart semantics. But, he
says, this is ‘for an irrelevant reason’. Lewis might have been one of identical twins
and so, ‘my body therefore does have two different counterparts in certain worlds’
(1971, p. 206). But he thinks a variant of the Leibniz Law argument against contingent
identity can be run, by factoring out this kind of case. His amended argument goes as
follows:
(11) I and my body are such that (without any duplication of either) they might not
have been identical today.
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(12) My body and my body are such that (without any duplication of either) they
might not have been identical today.
Lewis’s thought is that the ‘without any duplication of either’ clause should, in effect,
restrict the available worlds to ones with no more than one counterpart of me. As we’ve
seen, such worlds do not support contingent identity statements. The worry then is
that, since (12) is unsatisfiable and can be inferred from (11) plus the assumption that
I and my body are identical, we must reject the latter.
I’m not sure how best to understand the ‘no duplication’ clause. Since we’re assum-
ing that I and my body could have been distinct, Lewis can’t intend it as an all-out
ban on multiple counterparts (qua things most resembling me) in a world. For if my
body and I go separate ways in world w, then there are plausibly two things there best
resembling me: that possible person and that possible body. We could then analyse the
situation in terms of multiple counterparts. But we could also stick with one, relating
me to both that possible person and that possible body. If this is the story in general,
then the ‘no duplication’ clause will falsify (11) as well as (10). But then, the argument
poses no threat. We retain the possibility of me and my body being distinct, but only
via ‘duplication’.
It seems clear that this isn’t how Lewis understands his ‘no duplication’ clause. He
intends it to rule out his ‘twins’ scenario and other cases of physical duplication. But
if the clause is less restrictive than in the previous paragraph, then it will admit worlds
in which I (and my body) have multiple counterparts. That alone is enough to satisfy
both (11) and (12). So however the clause is understood, I don’t feel the pressure of
Lewis’s argument.
Lewis’s idea must have been that worlds with multiple counterparts of me are
the exception, rather than the rule, and that those abnormal worlds should not be
allowed to influence our stance on contingent identity. Perhaps there’s something in
that. Possibilities in which there are multiple entities, each of which resembles me just
as well as the others and better than any other things, do seem somewhat strange. That
plays into what we say about modality only on the assumption that de re modality is
ultimately about similarity, an assumption I’ve already rejected.
On the picture I’m suggesting here, worlds with multiple counterparts of something
are the norm. If the essence of a given table is something shared by all tables (or at
least, all tables of a particular kind), then every world containing tables (of that kind)
will contain multiple counterparts of our chosen table. That’s not a world of table-
duplicates: those tables may vary considerably in their accidental features (as they do
in our world). Similarity does not come into it, on the picture I’m suggesting. So we
are entirely justified in considering worlds containing multiple counterparts of some
thing—the usual case—when assessing the contingency of identity.
8 Modality in essential bundle theory
This picture begins to explain how my de re necessary properties outrun my essence.
All my counterparts are such that 1 + 1 = 2 and so it is de re necessary for me to be
such that 1 + 1 = 2. But this is no part of my essence, which says nothing about the
lives of numbers. Similarly, it’s de re necessary for me to be such that you are a person
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if you exist. That’s because all my counterparts are such that any counterpart of you
in the same world is human. But it’s no part of my essence that you’re human.
Given what I’ve said here, many modal questions remain unanswered. In partic-
ular, we don’t yet know which bundles can co-exist with which. A principle of free
recombination of bundles seems implausible. For an artwork-bundle to exist, we need
a plurality of person-bundles to exist also. There are existential dependencies between
bundles. (That’s not to say that there are necessary connections between distinct enti-
ties, for these need not be wholly distinct bundles. It’s plausible that something in the
specification of being an artwork involves the existence of a community of people
interacting in certain ways. Elsewhere (Jago 2018a, b) I develop a theory of non-
fundamental properties along these lines.)
These existential dependencies aren’t explained by anything I’ve said here. So an
account of which bundles can or must co-exist with which remains up for grabs. That
is the question of de dicto modality: which possible worlds exist? It’s a question for
another day. What I’ve done here is to show how to identify material entities across
possible worlds: the question of de re modality.
One may worry that I’ve exchanged one dark notion for one that’s even more
obscure: counterparts-via-similarity for essences. But essential bundle theory is
designed to de-mystify essences. Ontologically, essences are just mereological sums
of properties meeting certain conditions, which we can specify in non-modal terms.
There are no primitive properties of the form being essentially F . We don’t need to
introduce mysterious new entities to understand essences: we need only to accept
mereological summation on properties. One may object to that on the grounds that
only material entities are parts of other entities (Simons 1987). I don’t think that’s
right, but let’s agree for argument’s sake. No worries, since material entities are iden-
tified with sums of property instances, which are material, spatiotemporally located
entities. If abstract universals never sum together, there are no unified entities we can
call essences. But we can still talk about a thing’s essential properties: x (a sum of
property instances) is essentially F just in case x has an instance of F-ness as a part
and x and y are counterparts just in case they share all their essential properties.
9 Conclusion
Those attracted to a bundle theory of material objects should worry about their central
identity statement, a material object is a bundle of properties, when combined with
property possession role (Sect. 2). Essential bundle theory aims to avoid the
problem by taking the bundle in question to specify the object’s essential properties
(Sect. 3). But a variant of the modal problem remains. If a is located in region r , then r
partly fixes the a-bundle’s identity, seemingly implying that, of necessity, a is located
in r (Sect. 3).
Bundle theorists (whether of the traditional or the essential variety) must reject the
necessity of identity. Counterpart semantics offers a clear model of contingent identity
(Sect. 5). If we accept Lewis’s theory wholesale, then the identification of a material
object with a specific bundle will be a contingent matter. It could have been some
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other bundle. On that picture, there is little reason to opt for essential bundle theory
over the traditional picture.
I argued that we should not accept Lewis’s analysis of counterpart theory, with
counterpart relations based on similarity (Sect. 6). Modality is not, at bottom, about
similarity. Essential bundle theory offers a more plausible interpretation of counterpart
semantics: the counterpart relation is the same-essence relation (Sect. 7). This is an
equivalence relation, broader than identity, and there is just one counterpart relation.
This delivers contingent identity, without denying the necessity of any logical law.
This account provides answers specifically about de re necessity, but remains silent
on many aspects of de dicto necessity (Sect. 8). For a complete account of modality,
we would need to understand which essences are compossible with which: a question
for another day.
The immediate question of this paper was: can essential bundle theory overcome
the modal problem? The answer is that it can, in a principled and illuminating way, and
in a way that traditional bundle theory cannot straightforwardly accept. That provides
a strong reason to prefer essential bundle theory over the traditional approach.
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